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The Next Step in DNA Databank Expansion?
The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling of
Former Arrestees
JACQUELINE K. S. LEW*
INTRODUCTION
Every state requires that persons convicted of certain offenses
submit a DNA sample for inclusion in both the state's, and a national,
databank.' In recent years, the scope of individuals included in these
databanks has greatly expanded.2 Although all states compel DNA
sampling from felony sex offenders,3 and most include DNA samples
from violent felony offenders,4 many now require samples from adults
convicted of any felony, those convicted of certain misdemeanors, and
those on probation or parole.' Additionally, as of November 2004, four
states mandate DNA collection upon arrest.
6
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I. COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM (CODIS), http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/clickmap.htm (last
visited Mar. 5, 2005); see also Bonnie L. Taylor, Comment, Storing DNA Samples of Non-Convicted
Persons & the Debate Over DNA Database Expansion, 2o T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 509, 513-14 (2003).
2. See generally Aaron P. Stevens, Note, Arresting Crime: Expanding the Scope of DNA
Databases in America, 79 TEX. L. REv. 921 (2001).
3. State DNA Database Laws Qualifying Offenses, http://www.dnaresource.com (follow
"Support Materials" hyperlink; then follow "State DNA Database Laws Qualifying Offenses"
hyperlink) (2004) (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
4. Id.; see also Taylor, supra note I, at 5t4.
5. State DNA Database Laws Qualifying Offenses, supra note 3.
6. Id.; see Proposition 69, Nov. 2, 2004 Election Results (2004), http://www.smartvoter.org/2004/
ii/o2/ca/state/prop/69 (last visited Jan. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Prop. 69 Results]. In its Nov. 2, 2004
general election, California joined Louisiana, Texas, and Virginia as the only states requiring DNA
sampling upon arrest for certain felonies. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:602 (2004) (DNA Detection of
Sexual and Violent Offenders); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 411.1471 (2004) (DNA Database System);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-310.2 (2004) (DNA Analysis and Data Bank).
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Not surprisingly, these expansions have met with a variety of
constitutional challenges, most frequently based on the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.
However, the vast majority of attempts to challenge state DNA database
laws have failed.8 Still, as the scope of DNA databanks around the
country continues to expand, courts may become more willing to impose
limits on the government's ability to forcibly extract DNA from certain
statutorily designated classes of individuals.9 In particular, recent
controversy surrounding the passage of California's Proposition 69 may
provide some clue as to the direction of forthcoming DNA databank
expansions, as well as to the ability of these expansions to pass
constitutional muster.
To date, those forced to submit to suspicionless DNA extraction
under state and federal law-and, consequently, those who have brought
legal challenges to DNA databank statutes-have been under some form
of custody or supervision by the state, either as prison inmates,'1
probationers," or jailed arrestees' Indeed, courts often have relied on a
plaintiff's status as a supervisee or ward of the state to uphold the
constitutionality of DNA databank statutes. 13 However, the passage of
California's Proposition 69 in November 2004'4 has raised new questions
regarding the constitutionality of extracting DNA from individuals
7. Stevens, supra note 2, at 937 ("As of June 2000, state DNA database laws [have] been
challenged in sixteen jurisdictions on a variety of constitutional claims.").
8. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 831 n.25 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that DNA collection
statutes have been invalidated only three times); see also United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d io95 (9th
Cir. 2003), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 354 F.3d iooo (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Miles, 228
F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1135-40 (E.D. Cal. 2002); Maryland v. Raines, 857 A.zd 19 (Md. 2004).
9- Stevens, supra note 2, at 942.
io. See, e.g., Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding a Wisconsin statute that
permits the collection of DNA from incarcerated felons); Velasquez v. Woods, 329 F.3d 420 (5th Cir.
2003) (dismissing as frivolous a complaint by incarcerated felons that DNA sampling violated their
Fourth Amendment rights); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992) (addressing the
constitutionality of Virginia's statute requiring DNA extraction from incarcerated felons).
ii. See, e.g., Kincade, 379 F.3 d at 839 (upholding the constitutionality of DNA collection from
conditionally-released offenders).
12. To date, no court has addressed the constitutionality of requiring DNA sampling from
arrestees upon arrest.
13. Specifically, courts frequently point to the "substantially diminished expectations of privacy"
held by conditional releasees and inmates. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 839. For example, in upholding a
federal law authorizing the collection of DNA from individuals on supervised release, the Ninth
Circuit recently noted that "conditional releasees enjoy severely constricted expectations of privacy
relative to the general citizenry." Id. at 834; see also Groceman v. United States, 354 F.3 d 411, 413 (5th
Cir. 2004); Velasquez, 329 F.3 d at 421; Shaffer v. Saffie, 148 F.3d 118o, 1181 (ioth Cir. 1998); Jones, 962
F.2d at 306-07. Additionally, courts have cited supervision of parolees and inmates as presenting a
special need that justifies forgoing traditional Fourth Amendment protections-namely, the need to
deter convicted felons, shown to have higher rates of recidivism, from committing future crimes. See
Kincade, 379 F.3d at 839; Jones, 962 F.2d at 304.
14. Prop. 69 Results, supra note 6.
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neither under government supervision, nor, in fact, ever convicted of a
crime-a class of individuals to which traditional legal justifications
appear no longer to apply.
Specifically, the recently filed class action complaint in Weber v.
Lockyer'5 alleges that Proposition 69 goes beyond authorizing DNA
testing of individuals who are currently in custody or under government
supervision. 6 In addition to requiring DNA samples from individuals
upon arrest for specified crimes, Proposition 69 appears to require DNA
extraction from all persons with past arrests for these crimes, regardless
of whether or not the arrest resulted in a conviction, or even charges
being brought.'7 Thus, Proposition 69 arguably has made California the
first state to authorize suspicionless DNA collection from individuals no
longer under any government supervision. Further, in the case of
erroneously arrested individuals, Proposition 69 permits DNA extraction
from individuals who never should have been under government
supervision in the first place.'9
The current controversy in California regarding the reach of
Proposition 69's DNA databanking provisions, as well as current
developments in state DNA databanking laws," provide a lens through
which we might predict the next step in DNA databank expansion-the
collection of DNA from former arrestees, who neither have been
convicted of a felony nor remain in government custody.2' It is the
15. Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Weber v. Lockyer, 365 F.
Supp. 2d iii9 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (No. 04-5161), available at http://aclunc.org/police/DNA/o412o7-
complaint.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint].
16. Id. at 6-7.
17. Id. at 17.
I8. Id.
19. In response to the Weber challenge to Proposition 69, California Attorney General Bill
Lockyer filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the class action plaintiffs have misinterpreted
Proposition 69's scope. Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendants Lockyer, Steinberger, and Gima
to Dismiss the Complaint at 5-6, Weber, 365 F. Supp. 2d Ii9 (No. 04-5161) (on file with the Author)
[hereinafter Lockyer Motion to Dismiss]. Specifically, the Attorney General announced the State's
position that the expanded arrestee provisions of Proposition 69 do not authorize DNA sample
collection for arrests for felony sex offenses occurring before November 3, 2004, and, relatedly, do not
apply retroactively to felony arrests that occur before January 1, 2009. Id. In the alternative, however,
the Attorney General argued that even if the plaintiffs have correctly interpreted Proposition 69 as
retroactively applicable to them, their claims were not ripe for judicial decision and do not present a
justiciable case. Id. at io-i I. In April 2005, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California dismissed the Weber complaint as constitutionally unripe, thereby delaying resolution of
the constitutional questions raised by the complaint until such time as the court "will be better able to
evaluate whether plaintiffs have a reasonable fear of DNA testing under Proposition 69." Weber, 365
F. Supp. 2d at 1125. For further discussion of the district court's decision, see infra Part III.C.
20. See infra Part III.A.
21. For thoughtful discussions on the constitutionality of forcible DNA extraction upon arrest,
see D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, TO CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 455
(2001); Martha L. Lawson, Note, Personal Does Not Always Equal "Private": The Constitutionality of
Requiring DNA Samples from Convicted Felons and Arrestees, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 645 (2001);
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purpose of this Note to examine the constitutionality of this impending
step in DNA databank expansion, and to determine whether the
continued expansion of DNA databanks has come to its constitutional
end. 2
This Note begins with a brief discussion of the science and history of
DNA databanks in the United States. Part I provides a description of
DNA and DNA analysis, as well as an account of the expansion of DNA
databank use from the federal level to the state and local levels. Part II
then addresses Fourth Amendment challenges brought against various
DNA databank statutes, and notes that individuals covered by these
statutes traditionally have been under some sort of government
supervision.
Part III explores the growing debate regarding DNA databank
expansion in the area of DNA sampling upon arrest, the latest expansion
in DNA databanks to date. To place Weber in the context of this new
area of controversy, Part III describes the three state DNA databank
laws that currently authorize DNA sampling of felony arrestees upon
detention. Part III then discusses the Weber complaint's interpretation of
California's new DNA databank provisions as expanding the scope of
DNA databanks beyond any other currently in existence in the United
States. Although California's Attorney General has rejected the Weber
interpretation of Proposition 69's scope,23 in light of California's
leadership role in the state legislative arena24 and recent political
sentiment in favor of expanding federal DNA databanks,25 this Part
concludes that the emergence of DNA databanking laws that authorize
DNA sampling of former arrestees no longer in custody is imminent.
Part IV directly addresses the constitutionality of forcible DNA
extraction from former arrestees now exonerated and no longer in
custody. Specifically, it argues that taking, analyzing, and storing DNA
samples and data from former arrestees no longer under government
supervision violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Part begins by describing the
current state of Fourth Amendment constitutional law with regard to
DNA databanks, and notes two distinct analytical approaches adopted
by the split federal circuit courts as a result of the Supreme Court's
Taylor, supra note i.
22. However, this Note will not address the separate question raised in the Weber complaint
regarding the constitutionality of forcible DNA extraction from former felons no longer under any
type of governmental supervision. See Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, at 5.
23. Lockyer Motion to Dismiss, supra note i9, at 8-io.
24. See infra Part I1.C (citing United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3 d 813, 848-49 (9 th Cir. 2003)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("California's propositions frequently are emulated by other less
imaginative jurisdictions.")).
25. See infra Part III.C.
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decision in United States v. Knights.26 After concluding that traditional
"special needs" analysis continues to apply to suspicionless searches of
individuals free from government supervision, Part IV applies the special
needs approach to analyze the constitutionality of forcible DNA
extraction from former arrestees.
Using this analytical framework, Part IV argues that suspicionless
DNA sampling from former arrestees serves solely a normal law
enforcement purpose-namely, to solve crimes-in violation of the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.
Part IV concludes that even if a court should find that the suspicionless
searches entailed by DNA sampling of former arrestees present a special
need beyond the normal need for law enforcement, the private interest
citizens have in their bodies and genetic information outweighs the
public interest in these suspicionless searches-thereby rendering these
searches constitutionally invalid.
I. DNA DATABANKS IN THE UNITED STATES:
SCIENCE AND HISTORY
A. THE SCIENCE OF DNA ANALYSIS
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is a complex molecule that carries a
person's genetic information and is found in the nuclei of human cells."
The molecule is comprised of a particular sequence of four different
chemical building blocks called nucleotides and determines an
individual's unique genetic code." Generally, when DNA is analyzed, it
reveals a variety of information about its carrier, including his or her
ethnicity, physical characteristics, genetic defects, propensity to certain
diseases, and relationship to other individuals." In recent years, scientists
have suggested that DNA may carry information that can be used to
predict personality traits, propensity to antisocial behavior, and sexual
orientation."
Currently, the primary method of analyzing DNA samples for
inclusion in state and federal databases is the Short Tandem Repeats
(STR) method. Traditionally, DNA was analyzed using Restriction
Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) technology, which used large
fragments of DNA separated by size to create a profile. However,
26. 534 U.S. I12 (2001).
27. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302,303 (4th Cir. 1992).
28. Id. With the exception of identical twins, the sequence of nucleotides is arranged differently
for every individual. Id.
29. Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, at I9.
30. Id.
31. U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, THE FBI's DNA AND DATABASING INITIATIVES (2OoO), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/fbidna.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter FBI's INITIATIVES].
32. Id.
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because RFLP analysis required larger, non-degraded samples,33 such as
sterile blood samples 3' that were often unavailable at crime scenes,3" STR
analysis has become more popular. 6 Using Polymerase Chain Reaction
(PCR) to amplify certain repeating stretches of DNA called "short
tandem repeats," STR technology may analyze even small or degraded
samples for inclusion in a DNA databank.37 Thus far, STR technology
has been used to extract and analyze DNA from blood, skin tissue, hair
follicles, semen,3 tooth pulp,39 and bone marrow,' as well as DNA left
behind on "gum, envelopes, weapons, rocks, and food products."4'
The stretches of DNA that are analyzed in the STR process are
considered "junk DNA"-genetically non-informative DNA not
presently recognized as containing useful genetic programming
material. According to the legislative history of the federal DNA
databanking statute,43 these non-genic stretches of DNA were "purposely
selected because they are not associated with any known physical or
medical characteristics."' Although use of these so-called "junk sites"45
limits the type of information that can be gleaned from DNA analysis,
DNA profiles generated by the STR process are still highly individuated
and carrier-specific. 46 These profiles subsequently allow scientists to
compare the DNA from two biological samples-for example, from
samples left at a crime scene and from samples taken from a suspect-to
determine whether the samples came from the same individual.47 As a
result, DNA profiles generated by STR technology have been described
as "DNA fingerprints." 48
33. Id.
34. Stevens, supra note 2, at 934-35 n.95.
35. FBI's INrrIATIVES, supra note 31.
36. Id.
37. Id. DNA analysis may now be done on "all kinds of human material, 'from dandruff to old
and damaged samples of blood and sperm,"' as well as on "old fragments of DNA damaged by
bacteria or fungi (such as from a badly decomposed body)." Stevens, supra note 2, at 935 n.96.
38. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302,304 (4th Cir. 1992).
39. Lawson, supra note 21, at 648.
40. Id.
41. LABORATORY CORP. OF AM., STR DNA Analysis (2003), http://www.labcorp.com/fid/
strdna.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) (describing the types of evidence from which DNA may be
extracted and analyzed by the Laboratory Corporation of America, a lab that performs DNA analysis
for the FBI's national DNA database).
42. Kincade v. United States, 379 F.3 d 813, 88 (9th Cir. 2004).
43. DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000,42 U.S.C. § 14135a (Supp. 2003).
44. H.R. REP. No. IO6-9oo, pt. I, at 27 (2000).
45. Id.
46. NAT'L COMM. FOR THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T. OF
JUSTICE, THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING: PREDICTIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
WORKING GROUP 35 (2OOO), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesi/nij/i83697.pdf (last visited Feb.
7, 2005) [hereinafter FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING].
47. Lawson, supra note 21, at 647.
48. Id. at 657; see also Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, at 19.
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Although some suggest that DNA profiling is "analogous to the
analysis of a dermatoglyphic fingerprint"49 because a DNA profile only
individuates, rather than codes for genetic traits, others argue that "DNA
fingerprint" is a "misnomer"5 for two reasons. First, while fingerprinting
only "involves the creation of an image or impression of the external
physical conformation of the fingertips,"'5 " DNA is not displayed on the
surface of the body and its extraction requires some measure of bodily
intrusion. 2 Second, while fingerprints reveal no other information about
a person except for his identity, DNA "can reveal a vast array of highly
private information about that person."53 Indeed, despite assertions that
"junk DNA" is entirely non-genic and uninformative, many scientists still
dispute that characterization. 4 In addition to containing "instructions
essential for the growth and survival of people and other organisms,"55
junk DNA may reveal personal information about its carrier, including
his or her relationship to other people 6 and the likelihood that the
carrier is of a particular race or sex.57 In fact, some studies have suggested
that regions of DNA previously thought to be junk DNA may in fact be
genic."' Additionally, whether or not the type of personal information
contained in junk sites is limited, DNA samples themselves contain the
carrier's complete genetic and medical information. 9  Because
government laboratories usually store the actual DNA samples" instead
of destroying them after analysis of the junk sites, future testing remains
a possibility. This option is not available in the case of fingerprints, which
only provide information about an individual's identity.
B. THE RISE OF DNA DATABANKS IN THE UNITED STATES
In 1989, Virginia became the first state in the nation to develop a
49. Lawson, supra note 21, at 657.
50. Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, at 19.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Kincade v. United States, 379 F.3d 813, 818 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004); Justin Gillis, Genetic Code of
Mouse Published; Comparison With Human Genome Indicates "Junk DNA" May Be Vital, WASH.
PosT, Dec. 5, 2002, at Ai (describing studies revealing that junk DNA contains valuable information
about how the body uses genes and that the "instruction set (contained at junk sites] is at least as big as
the gene set, and probably bigger").
55. Gillis, supra note 54.
56. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 818-i9 n.7.
57. Id. at 818 ("Because there are observed group variances in the representation of various
alleles at the STR loci, however, DNA profiles derived by STR may yield probabilistic evidence of the
contributor's race or sex." (citing FUTURE OF FOREN Sic DNA TESTING, supra note 46)).
58. See Clive Cookson, Regulatory Genes Found in "Junk DNA," FIN. TIMES (London), June 4,
2004, at Is; Function Found for Junk DNA, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 2004, at A14.
59. Stevens, supra note 2, at 935.
60. As of 2001, only one state required disposal of DNA samples following analysis. Id.; see
Deoxyribonucleic Acid Analysis and Databank, Wis. Stat. Ann. § I65.77(2)(a)(3) (West 2005).
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forensic DNA databank.6' Other states have since followed Virginia's
lead, and by June 1998, all fifty states had passed statutes authorizing the
creation of state DNA databanks." The national DNA databank system
known as the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) began as an
extension of these state databanks. 63 A year after Virginia established the
nation's first DNA databank, the FBI launched a pilot project serving
fourteen state and local laboratories-a project that later developed into
CODIS. 64 The DNA Identification Act of 1994 officially authorized the
FBI to establish a national DNA index for law enforcement purposes6,
containing information from four sources: "persons convicted of crimes,"
"samples recovered from crime scenes," "samples recovered from
unidentified human remains," and "samples voluntarily contributed from
relatives of missing persons."66
The CODIS system established by the DNA Identification Act uses
two different indexes to generate investigative leads in crimes where
biological evidence is discovered at a crime scene: the Forensic and
Offender indexes. 6' The Forensic Index consists of DNA profiles
recovered from crime scene evidence and is used primarily to identify
serial offenders by linking crimes to an unknown individual.6 The
Offender Index contains DNA profiles of convicted felons, which are
compared to the profiles in the Forensic Index.69 As of July 2005, of the
2,485,857 total profiles stored in the CODIS system, 14,i02 are Forensic
profiles and 2,599,959 are Convicted Offender profiles.0
CODIS is comprised of DNA databanking information shared
among three hierarchical levels-local, state, and national.7 All DNA
profiles originate at the local level in law enforcement crime laboratories,
which use the Local DNA Index System (LDIS) to analyze and develop
these profiles. 7' The DNA profiles then flow to the State DNA Index
System (SDIS), which allows local laboratories within the state to
exchange profiles.73 At the national level, the FBI maintains the National
DNA Index System (NDIS), which permits state and local laboratories
61. Stevens, supra note 2, at 925.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 926-27.
64. THE FBI's COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM PROGRAM: CODIS, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/brochure.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14131-14134 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
66. 42 U.S.C. § I4132(a) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
67. THE FBI's COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM PROGRAM: CODIS, supra note 64; Stevens, supra
note 2, at 927.
68. Stevens, supra note 2, at 927.
69. Id.
70. COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM (CODIS), supra note I.
71. THE FBI's COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM PROGRAM: CODIS, supra note 64.
72. Id.; Stevens, supra note 2, at 927.
73. Stevens, supra note 2, at 927-28.
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participating in the CODIS system74 to exchange, compare, and search
DNA profiles from across the nation.75 State and local agencies
participating in CODIS have discretion in deciding what information
contained in their DNA profiles will be relayed to the national level
based on their specific legislative or legal requirements. 76 All fifty states
have become participants of CODIS.77 California alone has compiled
271,700 total profiles, more than any other state7
C. A SUMMARY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO COMPULSORY
DNA EXTRACTION
A spate of legal challenges to DNA databanking followed shortly
after Virginia launched the nation's first DNA database.79 Most of these
challenges have alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures,"' and most have been
unsuccessful.8 ' In upholding the Fourth Amendment constitutionality of
these DNA databanking statutes, federal circuit courts have taken two
distinct approaches: traditional Fourth Amendment balancing test
analysis and the "special needs" doctrine. In both instances, a major
factor in the courts' analyses has been the plaintiff's reduced expectation
of privacy as a supervisee or ward of the state. 3
74. State and local law enforcement labs participating in CODIS receive CODIS software,
installation, and user support free of charge. Id. at 928.
75. Id. at 927-28.
76. Id. at 928-29.
77. Taylor, supra note I, at 513-14.
78. COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM (CODIS), supra note I. The impact of Proposition 69 on the
expansion of California's DNA database will be revealed quarterly:
On or before April I in the year following adoption of the act that added this paragraph,
and quarterly thereafter, the Department of Justice DNA Laboratory shall submit a
quarterly report to be published electronically on a Department of Justice website and
made available for public review. The quarterly report shall state the total number of
samples received, the number of samples received from the Department of Corrections, the
number of samples fully analyzed for inclusion in the CODIS database, and the number of
profiles uploaded into the CODIS database for the reporting period.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 2 9 5 (h)(4) (2005).
79. See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. t992) (representing the first federal appellate
case to address the constitutionality of DNA databanking for convicted offenders). As indicated
above, "[a]s of June 2000, state DNA database laws had been challenged in sixteen jurisdictions."
Stevens, supra note 2, at 937.
8o. Stevens, supra note 2, at 937.
8i. United States v. Kincade, 379 F-3d 813, 831 n.25 (9th Cir. 2004). Indeed, DNA collection
statutes have been invalidated only three times, only to be upheld on appeal or overturned by later
circuit court decisions. See United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1113 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated and
reh'g en banc granted, 354 F.3d iooo (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1140
(E.D. Cal 2002); Maryland v. Raines, No. 98303 (Montgomery County Cir. Ct. Crim., Jan. 27, 2004),
vacated, 857 A.2d i9 (Md. 2004).
82. See infra Part III.A.
83. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 834, 839; Groceman v. United States, 354 F-3d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2004);
Velasquez v. Woods, 329 F.3d 420, 421 (5th Cir. 2003); Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d ii8o, 118i (ioth Cir.
1998); Jones, 962 F.2d at 306-7.
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In one category of cases, a number of federal courts have upheld the
constitutionality of compelled DNA extraction from prison inmates,
citing the inmates' substantially diminished expectation of privacy as the
main justification. In Jones v. Murray, the Fourth Circuit became the first
federal appellate court to address the constitutionality of DNA
databanking as applied to convicted offenders.8 4 In reaction to Virginia's
recently enacted statutory requirement that incarcerated felons provide
the state with a blood sample for DNA analysis, six inmates refused to
submit to DNA sampling, claiming that Virginia's statute violated the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures.' Although the Fourth Circuit recognized that the Fourth
Amendment applies to prison inmates, it held that prison inmates are not
entitled to the usual Constitutional requirement that probable cause or
even individualized suspicion support a bodily search. Instead, the court
held that persons under state supervision, whether detained following
arrest or conviction, or on probation, lose "some, if not all, rights to
personal privacy otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment."8 The
court justified this reasoning by asserting that "probable cause had
already supplied the basis for bringing the person within the criminal
justice system."' 8 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit found the plaintiffs'
status as wards of the state so central to its analysis as to distinguish
"prison inmates... [as] compris[ing] a separate category of cases to
which the usual per se requirement of probable cause does not apply."' 9
In light of these considerations, the Fourth Circuit proceeded to balance
the state interest in establishing the DNA database against the intrusion
upon the inmates' privacy interest and found that the state's interest in
identification outweighed the inmates' nearly negligible privacy
interests. 90
The Fifth,9' Seventh,92 and Tenth93 Circuits have applied similar
reasoning to uphold the constitutionality of compulsory DNA sampling
of prison inmates. In validating Wisconsin's DNA databank statute,
which requires DNA sampling of incarcerated felons, the Seventh Circuit
in Green v. Berge contrasted the "limited privacy interests that prisoners
retain ' with that of persons "free of state custody."95 Similarly, in
84. Jones, 962 F.2d at 303.
85. Id. at 304-05.
86. Id. at 307 n.2.
87. Id. at 3o6.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 307 n.2.
9o. Id. at 307.
9i. Velasquez v. Woods, 329 F.3d 420,421 (5th Cir. 2003).
92. Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675,679 (7th Cir. 2004).
93. Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 118o, 1181 (ioth Cir. 1998).
94 Green, 354 F.3 d at 677.
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Shaffer v. Saffle, the Tenth Circuit cited "an inmate's diminished privacy
rights" as one of three reasons for upholding Oklahoma's DNA
databank statute. 6 And in Velasquez v. Woods, the Fifth Circuit
dismissed as frivolous a complaint by incarcerated felons that DNA
sampling violated their Fourth Amendment rights, citing the Tenth
Circuit's language in Shaffer describing inmates' diminished privacy
rights.97
In a second category of cases upholding the federal DNA database
statute, the Ninth Circuit has extended the reduced expectation of
privacy rationale to "parolees and other conditional releasees." 9 In
United States v. Kincade, the Ninth Circuit recently reconsidered the
constitutionality of compulsory DNA sampling of conditionally released
offenders in the absence of individualized suspicion.' As a critical part of
its Fourth Amendment balancing test analysis, the Ninth Circuit noted
that "conditional releasees enjoy severely constricted expectations of
privacy relative to the general citizenry""-first, because their freedom
has been conditioned on compliance with certain requirements that
necessarily infringe on their privacy interests,'0 ' and second, because
individuals who have been in custody "leave prison with substantially
reduced sensitivities" to bodily intrusions.' 2 Ultimately, the court upheld
the federal DNA databank statute, finding that the government's
''compelling" interest in identification and deterrence of crime
outweighed the minimal privacy interests conditional releasees possess as
a result of their status as state wards.' °3
Thus far, the federal circuits' almost unanimous endorsement of
DNA databank statutes has rested upon the conclusion that the plaintiffs
are entitled to a drastically reduced modicum of privacy as a direct result
of their detention or supervision by the state. As illustrated below, the
courts must significantly alter their analysis when plaintiffs who are no
longer under government supervision bring Fourth Amendment
challenges to DNA databank statutes.
II. DNA SAMPLING UPON ARREST:
AN EMERGING AREA OF EXPANSION
To date, no court has addressed the constitutionality of requiring
95. Id. at 679.
96. Shaffer, 148 F.3d at 181.
97. Velasquez v. Woods, 329 F.3d 420, 421 (5 th Cir. 2003).
98. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 833 (9th Cir. 2004).
99. Id. at 816.
too. Id. at 834.
IoI. Id.
102. Id. at 837.
103. Id. at 836-39.
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DNA sampling upon arrest, much less the constitutionality of requiring
DNA sampling from former arrestees. In fact, only four states, including
Louisiana,' 4  Texas, 5  Virginia," 6  and most recently, California,"'7
currently mandate DNA collection upon arrest. However, a debate is
emerging among legal scholars regarding whether this trend towards
expanding DNA databases to include more classes of individuals
comports with constitutional requirements.""6 Although some suggest that
expanding the scope of DNA databases to include arrestees exceeds
constitutional limits,"9 others conclude that DNA sampling of arrestees
may be justified by the same reasons that have supported the federal
circuits' approval of less expansive DNA databank statutes.""
This Part will place Weber v. Lockyer in the context of this relatively
new area of DNA databank expansion, first by describing the three state
DNA databank statutes that currently authorize DNA sampling upon
felony arrest, and then by discussing how California's Proposition 69
appears to expand DNA databanks even further to include former
arrestees. In light of the nationwide political trend towards DNA
expansion, this Part projects that DNA databank statutes soon may
expand to include former arrestees.
A. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK: STATE STATUTES AUTHORIZING
COMPULSORY DNA EXTRACTION UPON ARREST
In 1997, Louisiana became one of the first states"' to mandate DNA
sampling and analysis upon arrest for a felony or other specified offense,
including battery and sex-related crimes."2 At the time, Louisiana's
104. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:6oi-15:620 (2005).
105. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 411 . I41-4I 1. 154 (2005).
I06. VA. CODE ANN. §§ I9.2,310.2-310.7 (2004).
107. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 295-299.7 (2005).
io8. See generally Kaye, supra note 21 (examining the constitutionality of sampling and analyzing
DNA from arrested individuals and concluding that such sampling and analysis may be constitutional
in limited circumstances).
to9. See Taylor, supra note I, at 511 ("This Comment asserts that state DNA databases that index
the genetic profiles of non-convicted persons-including both arrestees and cleared suspects-are
unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.").
iIo. Lawson, supra note 21, at 657, 667 (arguing that arrestees possess a diminished expectation of
privacy similar to that of prisoners or pretrial detainees and urging states to "collect DNA samples
from arrestees and include DNA fingerprints analyzed from those samples in their DNA databases");
see supra Part I.C.
iii. In 1994, South Dakota passed a law permitting DNA sampling from people who had been
arrested for any crime, but the law was changed in t997 to authorize DNA sampling from convicted
offenders. Stevens, supra note 2, at 948.
112. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:609(A)(i) (2005).
A person who is arrested for a felony or other specified offense, including an attempt,
conspiracy, or criminal solicitation, or accessory after the fact of such offenses on or after
September I, 1999, shall have a DNA sample drawn or taken at the same time he is
fingerprinted pursuant to the booking procedure.
However, a lack of funds has prevented the Louisiana statute's implementation. Stevens, supra note 2,
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databank represented the most expansive DNA database in the nation.' 3
Texas followed with a more narrowly drawn statute in 2001, amending its
DNA databank law to compel DNA collection from defendants who
have been arrested for specified felonies, including family violence,
sexual assault, or child abuse, but only after having been convicted of or
placed on deferred adjudication for such an offense."4 Like the Louisiana
statute, Texas' statute called for the DNA sampling to occur at the time
of fingerprinting and booking."5 Finally, in 2002, Virginia authorized
DNA sampling and analysis of individuals arrested for a "violent felony"
prior to their release from custody."6 Virginia is unique in requiring that
a magistrate or grand jury find probable cause for the arrest prior to the
DNA sampling. '
Louisiana, Texas, and Virginia represent the nation's newest trend
towards expanding DNA databases to include profiles from individuals
arrested for a range of crimes beyond sexual offenses."8 As of June 2004,
four additional states, including Delaware, Illinois, New Jersey, and New
York, were considering expanding the scope of their DNA databanks to
include individuals arrested for felonies, violent felonies, or "crime[s] for
which fingerprints are required.."".9 Aside from the specific underlying
crimes that trigger DNA extraction upon arrest, databank laws in
Louisiana, Texas, and Virginia differ only in the process available for
expunging a DNA profile from the state's database. Although the Texas
statute provides for mandatory expunction of DNA profiles upon
acquittal of the defendant or dismissal of the case,"O both Louisiana andVirginia provide for expunction of their profiles and samples only upon
at 948.
113. Stevens, supra note 2, at 948.
114. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 411.1471(a)(2) (2005).
115. Id. § 41'.1471(b).
16. VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-310.2:1 (2004).
117. Id.
118. Aside from Louisiana, Texas, and Virginia, Mississippi and Kentucky require DNA samples
from individuals who are arrested for sexual felonies. Miss. CODE. ANN. § 45-33-37(2) (2004) ("From
and after January i, 1996, every individual.., in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections for a sex offense.., shall submit a biological sample for purposes of DNA identification
analysis before release from or transfer to a state correctional facility or county jail or other detention
facility."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.170(0) (2OO4) (providing that any person in the custody of the
Kentucky Department of Corrections after July 14, 1992, for specified felony sex offenses "may, have
a sample of blood, an oral swab, or sample obtained ... for DNA... law enforcement identification
purposes and inclusion in law enforcement identification databases").
119. SMITH ALLING LANE, APPLIED BIOSYSTEMS, 2004 DNA DATABASE EXPANSION LEGISLATION
(June 18, 2004), available at http://www.dnaresource.com/2004%2oDNA%2oExpansion %2obills.pdf
(last visited Mar. 10, 2005). A proposal to expand Washington's DNA database statute to include
persons arrested on any criminal charges died in committee. Id.
120. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 41I.147I(e) ("[O]n acquittal of a defendant.., or dismissal of the
case against the defendant, the court shall order the law enforcement agency taking the specimen to
immediately destroy the record of the collection of the specimen and require the department to
destroy the specimen and the record of its receipt.").
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request of the contributor following acquittal, reversal, or dismissal.2 '
B. PROPOSITION 69: A LOOK TOWARDS THE NEWEST EXPANSION IN THE
SCOPE OF DNA DATABASES
In November 2004, over 7 million Californians voted to pass
Proposition 69,' an initiative statute that promised to "help[] solve
crime, free those wrongfully accused, and stop serial killers"'23 by
expanding the state's DNA database to include adults arrested for or
charged with a serious felony offense.'2 4 By 2009, Proposition 69 requires
the collection of DNA from adults arrested for or charged with any
felony offense.'25 At first glance, Proposition 69 appears no more
expansive than other statutes that require DNA sampling upon arrest.
However, since Proposition 69's passage, California has been criticized as
having "the most draconian DNA database system in the country
because of Proposition 69.16
Specifically, as the class action complaint in Weber v. Lockyer
alleges, Proposition 69 appears to require DNA samples not only from
individuals arrested for or charged with murder, voluntary manslaughter,
or a felony sexual offense upon arrest, but also from all persons who
have ever been arrested for those offenses-and by 2009, DNA from all
persons who have ever been arrested for, or charged with, any felony
offense.' 7 This provision would apply regardless of whether or not the
arrest resulted in a conviction or even charges being brought."'
According to the plaintiffs, California's Proposition 69 thus presents the
newest expansion in DNA databases by authorizing DNA testing of
individuals who are not currently in custody or under government
supervision. Indeed, Proposition 69 mandates collection of DNA from
individuals who perhaps never should have been under government
supervision."9
121. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:614 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.7.
122. Prop. 69 Results, supra note 6. Proposition 69 passed with a majority vote of 62%, comprised
of 7,183,917 voters. Id.
123. SEC'Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION 62
(2oo4), available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/electionsviguide-pg4.htm (last visited Mar. 5,
2005) [hereinafter VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE].
124. CAL. PENAL CODE § 296(a)(2) (2005). Such offenses include the commission, or attempted
commission, of murder, voluntary manslaughter, and felony sex offenses. Id.
125. Id. § 296(a)(2)(C).
126. Press Release, ACLU of N. Cal., ACLU Files Challenge to Proposition 69: Lawsuit
Challenges Government Seizure of DNA Samples from People Never Convicted of Any Crime (Dec.
7, 2004), available at http://www.aclunc.org/pressrel/o412o7-dna.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2005)
(quoting ACLU attorney Julia Harumi Mass).
127. Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, at 17. Prior to the enactment of Proposition
69, California law only required DNA sampling of persons convicted of certain serious felony offenses.
Id. at 14.
128. Id. at 3.
129. Id. at 2.
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As a result of Proposition 69's passage, section 296 of the California
Penal Code now provides that any adult person who is arrested for or
charged with specified felony offenses-and commencing on January i,
2009, any adult person who is arrested for any felony offense-"shall
provide buccal swab samples, right thumbprints, and a full palm print
impression of each hand, and any blood specimens or other biological
samples required pursuant to this. chapter for law enforcement
identification analysis."'3 The language critical to the Weber plaintiffs'
interpretation of Proposition 69 is located at section 296.I(b), which
provides for "[r]etroactive application of paragraphs (I), (2), (3), (4), (5),
and (6) of subdivision (a).'' Section 296.I(b) thus provides for
retroactive application of the extraction-upon-arrest provision in section
296(a) of the Penal Code. According to the plaintiffs, section 296.I(b)
can only be interpreted as subjecting to DNA extraction and analysis "all
persons who have ever been arrested for or charged with" the specified
felonies prior to 2009, and any felony starting January I, 2009.' The
Weber plaintiffs find further support for their interpretation of
Proposition 69's expansive scope in section 296.I(a)(i)(B) of the Penal
Code, which declares that:
If the person subject to this chapter did not have specimens, samples,
and print impressions taken immediately following arrest or during
booking or intake procedures or is released on bail or pending trial or
is not confined or incarcerated at the time of sentencing or otherwise
bypasses a prison inmate reception center maintained by the
Department of Corrections, the court shall order the person to report
within five calendar days to a county jail facility or to a city, state, local,
private, or other designated facility to provide the required specimens,
samples, and print impressions .... "'
Thus, the plaintiffs argue, Proposition 69 requires anyone who has ever
been arrested and who, at that time, had not submitted to DNA sampling
to submit a DNA sample within five days of a court order after the
passage of Proposition 69.
The Weber plaintiffs' class includes "all persons who are, or will be,
compelled to submit to the involuntary collection of their DNA under
sections 295 et seq. of the California Penal Code solely by reason of the
fact that they have been arrested for, or charged with, a felony
offense."'34 Some of the named plaintiffs include: a victim of identity
130. CAL. PENAL CODE § 296(a) (2oo5).
131. Id. § 296.i(b).
132. Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint, supra note I5, at 17.
133. CAL. PENAL CODE § 296.I(a)(i)(B).
134. Plaintiffs Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, at 13. The Weber class of plaintiffs also
consists of:
All persons who previously have been convicted of a felony offense in California and are no
longer subject to any supervision of the criminal justice system, but who are nonetheless, by
reason of that prior conviction, required to submit to the involuntary collection of their
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theft who was mistakenly arrested in April 2004; a woman who was
arrested for, charged with, and later acquitted of murder when she shot
her husband in self-defense; a man who was erroneously arrested for
possession of medical marijuana; and a San Francisco resident who
participated in an anti-war demonstration in November 2004 and was a
member of the crowd of participants arrested for felony assault with a
deadly weapon when a bottle was thrown by an unknown person in the
crowd. '35
As the Weber plaintiffs indicate, Proposition 69's broad mandate
also covers:
[P]ersons who are [or have been] arrested for a felony but against
whom charges are quickly dropped in the recognition that they are
innocent and that no probable cause existed for the arrest in the first
place; persons against whom arrest warrants are [or have been] issued
as a result of mistaken identity, including victims of identity theft;
persons, such as victims of domestic violence, who are [or have been]
arrested for violence committed in self-defense and who either have
the charges against them dropped or are subsequently acquitted;
participants in political demonstration and other activities who have
committed no crime but are [or have been] nonetheless arrested in
connection with broad sweeps of participants by the police; persons
who are [or have been] wrongly arrested due to police misconduct;
persons who are [or have been] arrested for felony possession of
marijuana but against whom charges are dropped or dismissed upon a
showing that they were in lawful possession of the marijuana for
medical purposes; persons who are [or have been] subject to
overcharging upon their initial arrest for minor offenses and are hence
charged with felonies but are ultimately convicted of nothing more
than misdemeanors ... 136
Because Proposition 69 does not require probable cause or even
individualized suspicion to justify the compulsory DNA sampling and
analysis of arrestees, the plaintiffs argue that Proposition 69 violates the
Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures and the Fourteenth Amendment's right to privacy and due
process. 3
The plaintiffs further criticize California's newly modified
DNA under Sections 295 et seq. of the California Penal Code. ("Formerly Convicted
Persons Class").
Id.
135. Id. at 6-8.
136. Id. at 3-4.
137. Id. at 20-22. The lack of individualized suspicion underlying compulsory DNA extraction in
California becomes especially evident when one considers the types of offenses for which arrestees will
qualify for DNA testing by 2oo9-namely, offenses that do not require biological evidence to solve,
including "the use of unauthorized signatures in a campaign advertisement, writing checks with
insufficient funds, accepting a bribe to throw a sporting event, racing a horse under a fictitious name,
or counterfeiting railroad tickets." Id. at 3; see CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 115.J, 337c, 3 3 7f, 476(a), 481.
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expunction provisions as inadequate and burdensome, citing that
expunction will only take place upon request, in the absence of an
objection from the prosecuting attorney or the Department of Justice,
and only after a i8o-day waiting period has expired. 8 Additionally, the
plaintiffs note the troubling fact that "[t]he court has the discretion to
grant or deny the request for expungement," and that a "denial of a
request for expungement is a nonappealable order and shall not be
reviewed by petition for writ."'39 California's new expunction process'40
thus represents the most cumbersome of the four statutes that provide
for DNA sampling upon arrest.'4 ' When this provision is considered in
combination with what seems to be Proposition 69's radically broad
inclusion of former arrestees in the state's DNA databank, California
justifiably appears to represent the forefront of DNA databank
expansion. Accordingly, plaintiffs have requested from the court
declaratory and injunctive relief from the implementation of Proposition
69's provisions. '4
C. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS: THE IMPACT OF THE WEBER DISMISSAL
Since the filing of the Weber complaint in December 2004, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California has
dismissed the complaint as "constitutionally unripe."'43 As a result, the
court never had the opportunity to determine the expansiveness of
Proposition 69's scope or to resolve the constitutional questions raised in
the complaint. Whether Proposition 69's provisions apply to former
arrestees thus remains an open question.
In February 2005, California Attorney General Bill Lockyer filed a
motion to dismiss, asserting that the Weber plaintiffs construed
Proposition 69's scope too broadly.'" Specifically, the Attorney General
took the position that the expanded arrestee provisions of Proposition 69
neither authorize DNA sampling for arrests for felony sex offenses
occurring before November 3, 2004, nor authorize retroactive DNA
sampling from individuals arrested for felonies before January I, 2009. 
4
1
In support of the State's position, the Attorney General cited an
unofficial, unpublished "Information Bulletin" entitled "Proposition
69-DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act,
138. CAL. PENAL CODE § 299(a)-(c).
139. Id. § 299(C)(I).
140. Prior to the passage of Proposition 69, California's DNA databank statute provided for the
"automatic expungement of data and samples taken from persons whose convictions are overturned."
Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint, supra note I5, at 18.
141. See supra Part II.B.
142. Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, at 2o.
143. Weber v. Lockyer, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1124-26 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
144. Lockyer Motion to Dismiss, supra note i9, at io.
145. Id. at 8-9.
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Effective November 23, 2004," which was alleged to have been
distributed to California law enforcement authorities, and which
purports to make clear that the arrestee provisions of Proposition 69 do
not apply retroactively to arrests taking place prior to November 3, 2004,
or to felony arrests taking place prior to January I, 2009. ,6 In the
alternative, the Attorney General argued that even if plaintiffs correctly
interpreted Proposition 69 as retroactively applicable to them, their
claims were not ripe for judicial decision and did not present a justiciable
case.'
47
In their opposition papers, I41 the plaintiffs suggested that the
Attorney General's interpretation of Proposition 69's scope was not
binding'49 and thus could not provide certainty that state law enforcement
agencies would not apply Proposition 69's arrestee provisions
retroactively.50 Additionally, in pointing to the facts that the Attorney
General issued the draft Information Bulletin conveying his position on
Proposition 69's scope more than a month after the filing of the plaintiff's
complaint and that the bulletin had yet to be finalized, 5' the plaintiffs
argued that the Attorney General's assurances were of "questionable
reliability.' '52 Not only were his assurances non-binding,'53 but also the
current or future Attorney General could reverse the state's position on
Proposition 69's scope "without warning.', 54 For these reasons, the
plaintiffs insisted that the court rely on the text of Proposition 69 to
support an interpretation of the statute as authorizing DNA sampling of
former arrestees.
55
In considering the Attorney General's motion to dismiss, the
Northern District court focused exclusively on the issues of standing and
ripeness."6 The court applied the Ninth Circuit's three-pronged
framework for analyzing whether a constitutional challenge to a state
statute before its enforcement was ripe for review: "(i) whether the
plaintiffs have articulated a 'concrete plan' to violate the law in question,
146. Id.
147. Id. at I8-I9.
148. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, Weber, 365 F. Supp. 2d III9 (No. 04-5161) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Opposition]. For the
Attorney General's reply to the opposition, see Reply of Defendants Lockyer, Steinberger, and Gima
to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Weber, 365 F. Supp. 2d I 119 (No. 04-5161).
149. Plaintiff's Opposition, supra note 148, at 5.
15o. Id. at i.
I5. Id. at 4 ("The Attorney General gave this assurance in the form of a draft Law Enforcement
Information Bulletin issued on January 1i, 2005, more than a month after the Complaint in this case
was filed, and that is still not finalized.").
152. Id. at io.
153. Id.
154. Id. at i, ii.
155. Id. at 5-6.
156. Weber, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 1123-26.
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(2) whether the prosecuting authorities have communicated a specific
warning or threat to initiate proceedings, and (3) the history of past
prosecution or enforcement under the challenged statute."'57 Ultimately,
the court found that dismissal was warranted by a failure to meet the
latter two prongs of the Ninth Circuit test.' 8
First, the fact that Proposition 69 had been recently enacted and thus
lacked a history of past enforcement against the plaintiffs or other
similarly situated persons weighed in favor of finding the case
constitutionally unripe.5 9 Second, the court noted the absence of a
specific warning or threat that Proposition 69 would be enforced in the
manner feared by the plaintiffs; instead, the court pointed out that the
Attorney General's Bulletin strongly suggested that Proposition 69
would not be enforced against the plaintiffs or other similarly situated
persons."6 As a result, the complaint only posed hypothetical or abstract,
rather than definite and concrete injuries necessary to establish a
constitutional "case or controversy" for standing and ripeness
,6,
purposes.
Having found that the plaintiffs could not establish the ripeness of
their claims, the court refused to determine "whether plaintiffs have a
reasonable fear of DNA testing under Proposition 69. ",162 Instead, the
court noted that "the state's interpretation and enforcement of
Proposition 69 [would] become much clearer as January 2009 nears. '63
The court suggested that only then would it be in a position to make an
informed decision whether or not the plaintiffs had accuratelyZ
interpreted Proposition 69's provisions as applying to former arrestees. '
Because the court never addressed the merits of the complaint, Weber's
dismissal did not end the inquiry into the expansiveness and
constitutionality of Proposition 69's scope.
D. THE FUTURE OF DNA DATABANKS: COMPULSORY DNA SAMPLING AND
ANALYSIS OF FORMER ARRESTEES
Thus, regardless of the Attorney General's own interpretation of
Proposition 69's scope, the fact that Proposition 69's arrestee provisions
157. Id. at 1124 (citing Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 22o F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir.
2000)).
158. Id. at I124-26.
I59. Id. at 1126.
16o. Id. at 1125. However, the court acknowledged the possibility that the enforcement policy of
the state could change or that local officials might disregard the Attorney General's Bulletin. Id. at
1126. Under these circumstances, the court recognized that "the ripeness inquiry might lead to a
different answer." Id.
161. Id. at 1124,1126.
162. Id. at 1125.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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plausibly have been interpreted as mandating DNA sampling of all
former arrestees provides a lens through which we might predict the next
step in DNA databank expansion. First, California's status as a role
model in the state legislative arena suggests that the possibly
revolutionary scope of Proposition 69 may be adopted in other
jurisdictions. In fact, the Ninth Circuit's Judge Stephen Reinhardt has
specifically referenced California's Proposition 69 in pronouncing that
"California's propositions frequently are emulated by other less
imaginative jurisdictions," and in predicting drastic expansion to state
and federal databases.'65 Because no California court has either affirmed
or disaffirmed the Weber plaintiffs' interpretation of Proposition 69's
scope, the ambiguity of Proposition 69's reach may influence other states
to expand the scope of their own DNA databank statutes.
Second, recent political sentiment in favor of significantly expanding
the scope of federal and state DNA databanks further suggests that
DNA databank laws authorizing DNA sampling of former arrestees no
longer in custody is not an idle prospect. To begin with, both state and
federal legislatures are considering plans to expand their DNA databases
to include arrestees.' 66 In 1999, the seventeen hundred members of the
International Association of Chiefs of Police unanimously voted to urge
Congress to pass a federal law authorizing DNA sampling upon arrest.'67
Mandatory DNA testing of arrestees has also received support from
former U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno and from more than fifty-four
percent of the public.'6 Additionally, a study conducted in July 1999 by a
committee of the National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence
concluded that DNA sampling of arrestees probably would be
constitutional.'6 In fact, one of the principal reasons the FBI has yet to
implement DNA testing of arrestees is a lack of funds. 17 Furthermore,
the nationwide appeal of expanding DNA databases has not been limited
to DNA sampling upon arrest. Rather, some have suggested that
expanding the national DNA database to cover all Americans might
comport with Constitutional requirements.'7 ' For example, former mayor
of New York Rudolph Giuliani in 1999 called for comprehensive DNA
sampling and analysis from all individuals at birth.'72
65. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813,848-49 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
66. See supra Part III.A; Stevens, supra note 2, at 949-51.
167. Stevens, supra note 2, at 949.
168. Id. at 949-50.
169. MICHAEL SMITH, NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, LEGAL ISSUES WORKING
GROUP REPORT: CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF ARRESTEE DNA SAMPLING, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/topics/forensics/events/dnamtgtrans6/trans-j.html (July 26, 1999) (last
visited Mar. 5, 2005).
170. Stevens, supra note 2, at 951.
171. Id. at 955.
172. Id. at 955-56 ("Rudolph Giuliani, Mayor of New York, stated in 1999 that he would have no
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When considered alongside California's influence over state
legislation, such robust political sentiment for expanding the scope of
national and state DNA databases suggests that the next series of DNA
databanking laws will be modeled on the Weber plaintiffs' interpretation
of California's Proposition 69. It is likely then that the next step in DNA
databank expansion will be laws that authorize DNA sampling of former
arrestees. At the same time, however, DNA sampling of former arrestees
may mark the constitutional end of DNA databank expansion; for like
any other suspicionless bodily search and seizure, DNA sampling of
former arrestees must present a special need beyond an ordinary law
enforcement purpose.'73
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DNA SAMPLING
POST-ARREST UNDER THE SPECIAL NEEDS APPROACH
The passage of California's Proposition 69 and the arguments set
forth in the Weber complaint have raised new questions regarding the
constitutionality of extracting DNA from former arrestees. In the past,
the federal circuits' essentially undivided approval of state and national
DNA databank statutes has rested on the premise that a plaintiff enjoys
a reduced expectation of privacy as a supervisee or ward of the state.
However, traditional legal justifications do not apply to former arrestees
no longer under government supervision and never convicted of a crime.
This Part directly addresses the constitutionality of forcible DNA
extraction from former arrestees who have been exonerated and released
from custody. It begins by describing the current Fourth Amendment
framework for analyzing the constitutionality of DNA sampling by the
government, and notes two distinct analytical approaches adopted by the
federal circuit courts as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Knights. 4 Upon concluding that the Court's holding in
Knights does not require in this case a departure from the traditional
"special needs" analysis that applies to suspicionless searches, the Part
applies the special needs approach to analyze the constitutionality of
compulsory DNA sampling of former arrestees. Ultimately, this Part
finds that suspicionless DNA sampling of former arrestees primarily
serves the ordinary law enforcement purpose of solving crimes, and
thereby violates the Fourth Amendment.
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DNA DATABANKS
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be
objection to taking DNA samples from every infant and using them to create a comprehensive genetic
database for use in forensic identification and other areas.").
173. See infra Part III.A.
174. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
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secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures. ' ' 71
To determine the existence of a Fourth Amendment privacy interest, the
Supreme Court has set forth two requirements: "first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.", 7 6
Additionally, whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment depends on the nature of the search and the surrounding
circumstances. 77 Generally, a search is reasonable only when it is
accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable
cause." Even when the Court has held that probable cause is
unnecessary, 79 it usually requires "'some quantum of individualized
suspicion.,""' 80 Under Supreme Court doctrine, searches conducted with a
complete lack of suspicion are reasonable only when they present
"special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement" that make
individualized suspicion "'impracticable."'M Thus, conducting a
suspicionless search for a pure law enforcement purpose would seem to
violate the Fourth Amendment.18 Otherwise, a degree of individualized
suspicion less than probable cause is warranted only "when the balance
of governmental and private interests makes such a standard
reasonable.",8,
In its 1989 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n decision, the
Supreme Court considered whether suspicionless blood and urine testing
of railroad employees following major accidents qualified as a special
175. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
176. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
177. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,619 (1989).
178. Id.
179. The Supreme Court has exempted from the warrant and probable cause requirements of the
Fourth Amendment a limited number of searches, which fit roughly into three fluid categories
described by the Ninth Circuit. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 822-23 (9th Cir. 2004). The
first category involves "exempted areas," which include searches conducted at the national border, in
prisons, and at airports and entrances to government buildings. Id. at 822. The second category
involves "administrative" searches, which includes inspections of closely regulated businesses and
industries, such as the railroad industry. Id. at 823; see Skinner, 489 U.S. 602. The third category
involves "special needs." Kincade, 379 F.3d at 823. The first two categories, however, may be
subsumed under the third as "special needs." See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620.
i8o. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624 (citation omitted); see also Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37
(2000).
A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing. While such suspicion is not an "irreducible" component of reasonableness, we
have recognized only limited circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply. For
example, we have upheld certain regimes of suspicionless searches where the program was
designed to serve "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement."
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37 (citation omitted).
ii. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (citations omitted).
182. Id.
183. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001).
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need.' 84 The railroad had implemented these tests to address safety
concerns based on evidence that alcohol and drug abuse by railroad
employees had caused or contributed to a number of accidents.' In light
of "[t]he Government's interest in regulating the conduct of railroad
employees to ensure safety," the Court held that the search in Skinner
presented special needs "'beyond normal law enforcement."'"
' 6
Similarly, in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Court
considered whether state-authorized highway sobriety checkpoints
presented a special need beyond normal law enforcement.'8 7 Noting the
"magnitude of the drunken driving problem," as well as the State's
"'grave and legitimate"' interest in curbing drunken driving, the Court
held that highway sobriety checkpoints did present a special need beyond
normal law enforcement.'
In both Sitz and Skinner, the Supreme Court limited application of
the special needs doctrine to situations involving searches intended to
protect public safety from imminent harm. However, as the Court has
stressed, where the primary purpose of a government program is
"ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control,"
the program does not qualify as a special need."" Suspicionless searches
under such a program thus violate the Fourth Amendment.
In 2000, the Supreme Court considered in City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond the constitutionality of a highway checkpoint program that used
suspicionless searches to discover and intercept illegal drugs.'" The Court
distinguished the checkpoint program in Edmond from that in Sitz by
noting the different purposes of each program. The Court emphasized
that the checkpoint program in Sitz was "clearly aimed at reducing the
immediate hazard posed by the presence of drunk drivers on the
highways.'' By contrast, the primary purpose of the Edmond program
was to "detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing," a goal
"indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.""'9 The
Court further stated that only exigent circumstances, such as the flight of
a dangerous criminal, could justify checkpoints with the primary purpose
of crime control.'93 Noting the lack of such circumstances, the Court held
that the checkpoint program in Edmond did not qualify as a special
184. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606.
185. Id. at 608.
186. Id. at 620 (citation omitted).
187. 496 U.S. 444,447 (0990).
i88. Id. at 447,449, 451 (citation omitted).
189. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
19o. Id. at 34.
191. Id. at 39.
192. Id. at 38, 44, 48.
193. Id. at 44.
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need.'"
The following year, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Supreme
Court examined the constitutionality of a hospital program that tested
pregnant women for drug use and then turned over the results to law
enforcement officials if a woman tested positive twice.95 The government
hoped to protect the health of mothers and unborn children through the
threat of criminal punishment under the program.' 6 The Court held that
the program did not qualify as a special need because "the immediate
objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement
purposes."'" The Court noted that although a major goal of the program
was to aid women with substance abuse problems, the program's primary
law enforcement purpose disqualified the program as a special need.' 9
The Court further remarked that the "extensive involvement of law
enforcement officials at every stage of the policy" was significant in
determining that the program did not fall under the special needs
exception."9 In Ferguson and Edmond, law enforcement officials used
drug test results to investigate and prosecute criminal activity." By
contrast, drug and alcohol test results in Skinner were not intended to
"assist in the prosecution of employees .... Thus, in both Ferguson and
Edmond, the Supreme Court affirmed that where "law enforcement
authorities pursue primarily general crime control purposes," searches
"can only be justified by some quantum of individualized suspicion .....
B. CIRCUIT SPLIT IN THE APPROACHES TO ASSESSING THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DNA DATABANK STATUTES: THE
EFFECT OF KNIGHTS
Currently, the federal circuit is split as to the effect that the Supreme
Court's 2001 decision in United States v. Knights"° has on the
applicability of the special needs approach to bodily intrusions
occasioned by DNA databank laws. In Knights, the Supreme Court
considered whether the warrantless search of a probationer's home,
supported by reasonable suspicion, was constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment." Applying the traditional Fourth Amendment totality of
the circumstances balancing test rather than special needs analysis, the
194. Id. at 48.
195. 532 U.S. 67,72 (2001).
196. Id. at 81.
197. Id. at 83.
198. Id. at 83-84.
199. Id. at 84.
200. Id. at 72; Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34 (2000).
201. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989).
202. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47; Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 67.
203. 534 U.S. 112, 112(2001).
204. Id. at 114.
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Court held that the search was reasonable because there was a
"sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct [was] occurring.""
The Court ultimately found that the government's interest in public
safety justified the reduced degree of suspicion required to intrude on
Knights' privacy interests.206
i. Circuits in Favor of Using the Totality of the Circumstances
Approach
The Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, one Seventh Circuit judge,
and various federal district and state courts have interpreted the
Supreme Court's decision in Knights as signaling a limitation on when
the special needs doctrine will apply to suspicionless searches."° These
courts understand the special needs doctrine as being triggered by a
degree of suspicion less than probable cause. The fact that the Supreme
Court did not apply the special needs approach in Knights-where the
search was effected without warrant or probable cause-seemed to
indicate an exception to the general rule. Specifically, these courts view
the Court's decision in Knights to apply the totality of the circumstances
balancing test as suggesting that persons enjoying a significantly
diminished expectation of privacy as government supervisees or
detainees comprise a separate class of cases not subject to special needs
analysis.2" These courts thus reject the notion that "any search conducted
primarily for law enforcement purposes must be accompanied by at least
some quantum of individualized suspicion," and instead have construed
Knights as carving out a government-supervisee exception to the special
needs doctrine.2"
As a result, these courts have chosen to apply the totality of the
circumstances balancing test for reasonableness in considering whether
compulsory DNA extraction and analysis comport with Fourth
Amendment requirements." ' Because the only challenges to DNA
sampling statutes have come from individuals under either government
supervision or detention, these challenges have been considered in light
205. Id. at 121.
206. Id.
207. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3 d 813, 831 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Groceman v. United
States, 354 F.3d 41I, 413-14 (5th Cir. 2004); Velasquez v. Woods, 329 F.3d 420, 421 (5th Cir. 2003);
Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306-07 (4 th Cir. 1992).
208. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 832 ("Knights, of course, affirmed the post-Edmond, post-Ferguson
possibility that conditional releasees' diminished expectations of privacy may be sufficient to justify
the judicial assessment of a parole or probation search's reasonableness outside the strictures of
special needs analysis."); Jones, 962 F.2d at 307 n.2 ("Because we consider the cases which involve the
Fourth Amendment rights of prison inmates to comprise a separate category of cases to which the
usual per se requirement of probable cause does not apply, there is no cause to address whether the
so-called 'special needs' exception.., applies in this case.").
209. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 827; Groceman, 354 F.3d at 413; Velasquez, 329 F.3d at 421; Jones, 962
F.2d at 306-07.
21o. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 831.
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of these courts' government-supervisee exception to the special needs
doctrine.
2. Circuits in Favor of Using the Special Needs Approach
By contrast, the Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, as well as a
Ninth Circuit judge and various federal district and state courts, have
interpreted Knights as a non-special needs case, and have accordingly
analyzed the constitutionality of DNA collection statutes under the
Supreme Court's special needs doctrine. "' Specifically, these courts read
the special needs doctrine as being prompted by a complete lack of
individualized suspicion, rather than by a mere departure from probable
cause requirements.2 Thus, these courts construe the Court's decision in
Knights to apply the totality of the circumstances test as being based on
the presence of individualized suspicion."'
As a result of their interpretation of Knights as a non-special needs
case, these courts have analyzed Supreme Court case law in Ferguson
and Edmond as establishing a per se rule that searches must be
supported by some quantum of individualized suspicion, or alternatively,
must present a special need. Because DNA sampling of a class of
individuals occurs without any modicum of individualized suspicion,
these courts have applied the special needs approach and have upheld
DNA sampling statutes under a number of different rationales. 4
3. The Inapplicability of Knights to Statutes Authorizing DNA
Extraction from Former Arrestees
The federal circuits' split interpretation of the scope of cases covered
by special needs analysis is limited to those cases involving plaintiffs who
are under some form of government supervision or detention. Even the
courts that have applied the totality of circumstances approach to DNA
databank statutes have not suggested that Knights has completely
eliminated the use of the special needs approach in suspicionless search
cases. Rather, these courts have merely suggested that Knights provides a
government-supervision exception to the special needs approach.
Because the government-supervision exception to the special needs
doctrine is premised on the plaintiff's enjoyment of a significantly
diminished expectation of privacy as a government supervisee or
detainee, former arrestees no longer under any government supervision
and never convicted of a crime do not fall under any exception to the
211. Id. at 830, 840; see also Green v. Berge, 354 F-3 d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (ioth Cir. 2003); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999).
212. Kincade, 379 F.3 d at 862-63 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Groceman, 354 F.3d at 413; Velasquez,
329 F.3 d at 421; Jones, 962 F.2d at 306-07.
213. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 827.
214. For example, the special needs for supervision and deterrence of conditional releasees
provided the basis of the Ninth Circuit's upholding of the federal DNA databanking act in Kincade.
379 F.3 d at 841 (Gould, J., concurring).
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special needs approach. Former arrestees enjoy the same expectations of
privacy that any ordinary free citizen enjoys."5 Thus, to analyze the
constitutionality of statutes mandating suspicionless DNA sampling of
former arrestees, a court must apply special needs analysis.
C. ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DNA EXTRACTION FROM
FORMER ARRESTEES USING THE SPECIAL NEEDS APPROACH
i. Compulsory DNA Sampling and Analysis is a Search
Obtaining and examining physical evidence from a person in a way
that "infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable" is a Fourth Amendment search."6 Whether the
expectation of privacy an individual holds in his biological material is
reasonable may be determined by examining several factors, including
the extent to which the material is displayed to the public, the extent of
the bodily invasion occasioned by the sampling procedure, and the
nature of the information that can be gleaned from the sample."7
At present, DNA sampling statutes like Proposition 69 mandate
compulsory DNA extraction through taking either blood samples or
buccal swab samples.1 In Skinner, the Supreme Court established that
blood extraction, as a "physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin,"
infringes a reasonable expectation of privacy."9 The Court also stated
that "chemical analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data"-for
example, through urinalysis for blood-alcohol content-poses a further
invasion of privacy.20 The Court thus concluded that blood tests
constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment.2 ' Correspondingly,
DNA sampling statutes that authorize a compelled intrusion into the
body for blood, as well as DNA analysis, give rise to Fourth Amendment
searches.
For similar reasons, buccal swab sampling for DNA analysis also
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search." ' In Cupp v. Murphy, police
suspected the defendant of strangling his wife and subsequently scraped
his fingernails against his will and without a warrant to remove traces of
skin and blood cells.2 3 In finding that searches of an individual's body are
"'severe, though brief, intrusions upon cherished personal security' that
215. See infra Part III.C.2.
216. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,616 (1989).
217. Kaye, supra note 21, at 473.
218. CAL. PENAL CODE § 296(a) (2005).
219. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 617.
222. See Kaye, supra note 21, at 478; Sandra J. Carnahan, The Supreme Court's Primary Purpose
Test: A Roadblock to the National Law Enforcement DNA Database, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1, 8 (2oo4)
("[T]he use of buccal swabs to collect skin cells from the lining of the check.., is a search as well.").
223. 412 U.S. 291, 292 (1973).
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[are] subject to constitutional scrutiny," the Supreme Court held that the
fingernail scrapings constituted a Fourth Amendment search. 24
If scraping a fingernail to remove dried blood or other physical
evidence constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, so does scraping the
inside of a cheek for DNA analysis. Not only are cheek cells less exposed
to public view than fingernails,"' but also their extraction occasions a
greater bodily intrusion. Unlike fingernail scrapings, buccal swabs
require police to penetrate a bodily orifice. Additionally, DNA analysis
of buccal swab samples reveals just as much, and arguably more
personal, information than a fingernail scraping can.
Furthermore, free persons enjoy such a high expectation of privacy
that even fingerprinting implicates Fourth Amendment interests. Indeed,
the "gathering of fingerprint evidence from 'free persons' constitutes a
sufficiently significant interference with individual expectations of
privacy that law enforcement officials are required to demonstrate that
they have probable cause, or at least an articulable suspicion, to...
establish or negate the person's connection to the offense.""' 6 Former
arrestees who are no longer in custody and who have never been
convicted of a crime enjoy the same expectation of privacy as "free
persons," and thus are entitled to reasonable suspicion before being
subjected to DNA extraction and analysis-a much more intrusive
procedure than fingerprinting.27 Under traditional Fourth Amendment
doctrine then, compulsory DNA extraction and analysis constitute a
search that must be supported by a warrant and probable cause, or at
least individualized suspicion with respect to free persons.
2. The Lack of Individualized Suspicion Requires the Presence of
Special Needs, but DNA Sampling of Former Arrestees Serves
Only a Normal Law Enforcement Purpose
Statutes that mandate compulsory DNA sampling of former
arrestees, released from custody and never convicted of a crime,
authorize searches that are not supported by any individualized
suspicion. Rather, such sampling is based on an individual's status and
thus must present special needs to pass constitutional muster. However,
because the primary purpose of DNA sampling of former arrestees is a
normal law enforcement purpose-assisting law enforcement to solve
crime-such sampling does not qualify for special needs exemption from
the normal Fourth Amendment requirement of individualized suspicion.
To determine whether a search has as its primary purpose normal
224. Id. at 295 (citation omitted).
225. In Cupp, the police decided to perform the fingernail scraping after viewing a dark spot on
the defendant's finger. Id. at 292.
226. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3 d 813, 836 n.31 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
227. See supra Part II.A.
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law enforcement purposes, it is instructive to look to the language of the
statute. For example, Proposition 69 advances as its main purpose
"assist[ing] federal, state, and local criminal justice and law enforcement
agencies within and outside California in the expeditious and accurate
detection and prosecution of individuals responsible for sex offenses and
other crimes. ' '21S Proposition 69's "Findings and Declaration of Purpose"
further describes the "critical and urgent need to provide law
enforcement officers and agencies with the latest scientific technology
available for accurately and expeditiously identifying, apprehending,
arresting, and convicting criminal offenders...., 2 9 In Edmond, the
Supreme Court held that a government program with a primary purpose
of investigating potential criminal activity did not qualify for special
needs analysis. 3 Similarly, as suggested in the text of Proposition 69, the
government's primary purpose in conducting suspicionless, bodily
searches is to investigate potential and past criminal activity, both of
which constitute a normal crime control purpose.
Additionally, as the Supreme Court indicated in Ferguson, where
law enforcement officials are deeply involved in implementing DNA
sampling and analysis, as is customary in statutory DNA databanking
procedures, a presumption of ordinary law enforcement purposes
arises. 3' In California, law enforcement officials are engaged at every
step of the DNA databank procedure, from sample collection 32 to
analysis and processing of the samples.233 Thus, at least in California, law
enforcement is even more heavily involved in the implementation of the
bodily search than in Ferguson, where hospital personnel collected and
analyzed the biological samples at issue before sending them to the
police.34 The extensive involvement of law enforcement officials in
executing DNA statutes demonstrates that the primary purpose of the
searches involved is a law enforcement purpose. Ultimately then,
because the primary purpose of DNA sampling of former arrestees
would be to advance normal needs of law enforcement, such sampling
requires at least individualized suspicion. However, because such statutes
would operate in the absence of individualized suspicion, DNA sampling
of former arrestees would violate the Fourth Amendment.
228. CAL. PENAL CODE § 295(c) (2005).
229. VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, supra note 123, at 135.
230. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (200o).
231. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2oo).
232. CAL. PENAL CODE § 298(b)( 3 ) ("Buccal swab samples may be procured by law enforcement or
corrections personnel or other individuals trained to assist in buccal swab collection.").
233. Id. § 298.3.
234. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 72.
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3. DNA Sampling of Former Arrestees Does Not Present a
Special Need
In the past, proponents of DNA databank statutes have argued that
several other goals of DNA sampling advance special needs beyond
normal law enforcement purposes, including deterrence, exoneration of
the innocent, and identification of criminal offenders. However, none of
these goals can withstand scrutiny under special needs analysis when
considered in the context of DNA sampling of former arrestees.
First, pointing to the higher rates of recidivism associated with
individuals on conditional release from prison, the Second Circuit in Roe
v. Marcotte suggested that Connecticut's DNA databank statute's goal of
deterrence presented special needs beyond the normal need for law
enforcement."' However, deterrence cannot justify DNA sampling from
former arrestees no longer in custody and never convicted of a crime.
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that those with prior
convictions are more likely than ordinary citizens to violate the law,236
there is no evidence to suggest that individuals who once were arrested
but never convicted are more likely to engage in crime. Additionally,
even in the case of DNA sampling of conditional releasees, deterrence is
not the primary purpose of DNA databank laws. Instead, deterrence is
an incidental effect of the DNA databank statute's main purpose of
solving past and future crimes.
Second, proponents of DNA databanks have suggested that
increasing the accuracy of the criminal justice system by ensuring that
innocents are not wrongfully accused or convicted qualifies as a
compelling government interest that presents special needs beyond
ordinary law enforcement purposes.237 Indeed, California's amended
DNA databank statute presents as one of its purposes the exoneration of
innocent persons and exclusion of innocent suspects from investigation.238
However, this goal does not qualify for consideration as a special need.
First, ensuring the accuracy of criminal investigations by arresting and
convicting the right person is, or should be, a normal need of law
enforcement. 39 Second, even if it were not, the Supreme Court has noted
that a "benign" motive, such as that advanced in Ferguson, "cannot
justify a departure from Fourth Amendment protections" if the search
has a primary purpose of law enforcement. 4 Third, compulsory DNA
extraction is not necessary to further the government interest in
exonerating innocent persons, since individuals who claim wrongful
235. Roe v. Marcotte, i93 F.3 d 72,74,79 (2d Cir. 1999).
236. Carnahan, supra note 222, at 25-26.
237. Id. at 22-24.
238. CAL. PENAL CODE § 295(C) (2005).
239. Carnahan, supra note 222, at 24.
240. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 85 (2oo1).
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conviction or even wrongful accusation, may volunteer their DNA to
exonerate themselves."'
Finally, some courts have suggested that identification of criminal
offenders serves as the requisite special need that can justify
suspicionless DNA sampling of certain classes of individuals.242 In fact,
Proposition 69 recently added the goal of "assist[ing] in the accurate
identification of criminal offenders" to California's DNA databank
statute."3 However, just as the goal of deterrence cannot plausibly be
considered the primary purpose of DNA sampling, neither can
identification. Specifically, as one author suggests, "fingerprints already
provide an unequivocal, and in some respects, a better record of personal
identity than forensic DNA typing" for several reasons.2" First, DNA
analysis cannot distinguish between monozygotic twins, whereas
fingerprint analysis can."5 Second, fingerprints can be obtained more
easily and more inexpensively than DNA profiles'46 It is simply
implausible to argue that the lengthy and expensive process of extracting,
sending out, analyzing, and comparing DNA samples and profiles will be
used primarily for immediate identification purposes, when
fingerprinting is far more time- and cost-effective. Instead, DNA analysis
will only be used when the government has a compelling, albeit ordinary,
interest in solving crimes where biological evidence is discovered. Even
more importantly, former arrestees who have never been convicted of a
crime are not criminal offenders, and thus there is no special need to
identify former arrestees any more than there is a special need to identify
any member of the general population.
Because the primary purpose of DNA sampling of former arrestees
would be to solve crime-a normal law enforcement purpose-such
sampling must occur with individualized suspicion. But since such DNA
databanking statutes would be based purely on an individual's status as a
former arrestee, suspicionless DNA sampling of former arrestees would
violate the Fourth Amendment.
4. Even If DNA Sampling of Former Arrestees Qualifies as a
Special Need, Such Sampling Still Violates the Fourth
Amendment Because Former Arrestees' Privacy Interests
Outweigh the Government's Public Interest
When faced with special needs cases, the Supreme Court has "not
hesitated to balance the governmental and privacy interests" involved to
determine whether individualized suspicion is necessary to conduct a
241. Carnahan, supra note 222, at 24.
242. See, e.g., Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306-o7 (4th Cir. 1992).
243. CAL. PENAL CODE § 295(d).
244. Kaye, supra note 21, at 488.
245. Id. at 488-89.
246. Id.
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search. 7 The Court has held that, even in the absence of suspicion
"where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and
where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion
would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized
suspicion, a search may be reasonable .... 248
Thus, finding that a government search qualifies as presenting a
special need beyond the normal need for law enforcement does not
automatically render the search reasonable. The special need must be
"important enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy
interest" and to justify a departure from the Fourth Amendment's
normal requirement of individualized suspicion.249
In Chandler v. Miller, the Supreme Court considered whether a
statute requiring candidates for state office to certify that they had
passed a drug test presented a substantial enough special need.25° The
statute was not enacted in response to a suspicion of drug use by state
officials, but only to uphold state officials' image of integrity and good
judgment."' In assessing the private interests, the Court noted that the
testing method was "relatively noninvasive" because a candidate could
provide a urine sample for analysis at the office of his personal
physician."' Still, the Court found that the statute did not present a
substantial enough special need, since "public safety is not genuinely in
jeopardy." '253 As the Court's decision in Chandler indicates, even
relatively noninvasive suspicionless searches must be justified by a
deeply compelling government interest, usually marked by exigent
circumstances. 5
4
As discussed above,2 55 DNA extraction and analysis, whether
through blood sampling or buccal swab sampling, intrudes upon an
expectation of privacy that society holds as reasonable. Even brief,
minimal bodily intrusions, such as scraping fingernailszs 6 or taking
fingerprints,57 implicate "'cherished personal security' ... [and are]
subject to constitutional scrutiny." '': Unlike convicted felons currently in
247. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,6I9 (1989).
248. Id. at 624.
249. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305,318 (1997).
25o. Id. at 3o8.
251. Id. at 318-i9.
252. Id. at 310, 318.
253. Id. at 323.
254. See, e.g., Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447, 449, 451 (describing sobriety
checkpoints as justified by special needs, since the pervasive drunken driving problem posed
immediate danger on the roads).
255. See supra Part 1II.C.I.
256. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 0973).
257. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3 d 813,836 n.31 (9th Cir. 2004).
258. Cupp, 412 U.S. at 295 (citation omitted).
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government custody, former arrestees no longer under government
supervision and never convicted of a crime do not have a diminished
expectation in their bodily privacy.259 Thus, even fingerprinting requires
at least individualized suspicion when performed on a free person, such260 ..
as a former arrestee. Because DNA sampling and analysis implicate a
greater expectation of privacy, former arrestees are entitled to at least
individualized suspicion, if not more, when the government desires to
perform DNA sampling and analysis.
By contrast, the government's interest in gathering potential
evidence for investigating past and future crimes cannot outweigh former
arrestees' significant privacy interest in their bodies. In assessing the
legality of extracting blood from a suspected drunk driver, the Supreme
Court held that penetrative bodily intrusions cannot be justified "on the
mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a
clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these
fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that
such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search. '', 6, In
taking DNA samples from former arrestees, the sampling occurs without
any evidence to suggest that the sampled individuals are likely to commit
a crime in the future, or have committed a crime in the past.
Additionally, there are no exigent circumstances to justify such
suspicionless searches. These facts suggest that requiring individualized
suspicion will not jeopardize the government interest in crime control.
Additionally, the government's interest in deterring criminal
conduct does not outweigh the privacy interests held by former arrestees.
Because there is no evidence that former arrestees are more likely to
commit crimes than the average free person, the significant interests
former arrestees hold in their bodily integrity and genetic privacy
outweigh the purely hypothetical deterrent effect that DNA sampling
might occasion.
Furthermore, the government's interest in protecting the innocent
from wrongful conviction cannot outweigh the privacy interests held by
259. Taylor, supra note i, at 537. In fact, the Ninth Circuit has suggested that once a conditional
releasee has completed the terms of his conditional release, he becomes a "normal citizen" entitled to
full Fourth Amendment privacy interests and expectations. United States v. Crawford, 323 F.3d 700,
710 (9th Cir. 2003). Specifically, in considering whether a suspicionless search of a parolee's home
violated the Fourth Amendment, the Ninth Circuit held that parolees are entitled to the amount of
privacy that other citizens take for granted so that parolees might "negotiate the transition into the life
of a normal citizen." Id. Thus, even a convicted felon who is no longer under any supervision by the
government may enjoy the same Fourth Amendment rights as the general population.
260. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 836.
261. See supra Part III.C.i.
262. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-72 (1966) (holding that forced blood extraction
from a drunk driver who had just been involved in an accident was reasonable under Fourth
Amendment standards).
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former arrestees. As suggested above, individuals who are arrested or
convicted voluntarily may submit their DNA to exonerate themselves.263
Thus, requiring individualized suspicion would not jeopardize the
government's interest in exonerating and excluding the innocent from
conviction and investigation, respectively.
Finally, requiring individualized suspicion to extract and analyze
DNA samples from former arrestees would not jeopardize the
government's interest in identifying criminal offenders. The
government's interest in using DNA samples to identify former arrestees
who have never been convicted of a crime is minimal at best. First, such
former arrestees are not criminal offenders, and thus the need to identify
former arrestees is no more special than the need to identify any member
of the general population. Second, fingerprints provide an easier and
cheaper method of identification. Ultimately then, even if DNA
sampling and analysis of former arrestees presents a special need, the
private interest of sampled individuals would overwhelmingly outweigh
the government's interests in ordinary crime control, deterrence,
exoneration of innocents, and identification.
CONCLUSION
Proposition 69 and the ensuing controversy embodied in the Weber
v. Lockyer complaint have illuminated the next step in DNA databank
expansion: DNA sampling from former arrestees no longer under any
form of government supervision. To date, the courts' essentially
unanimous endorsement of DNA databank statutes nationwide has
rested upon the premise that the plaintiffs under detention or supervision
by the state enjoy a drastically reduced expectation of privacy. However,
as illustrated above, the courts must significantly alter their analysis of
DNA databank statutes when plaintiffs who are no longer under
government supervision bring Fourth Amendment challenges to DNA
databank statutes.
First, because an individual's status as a former arrestee removes a
DNA databank challenge from the federal circuit split on the effect of
Knights on special needs analysis, courts considering the constitutionality
DNA sampling of former arrestees will be compelled to apply special
needs scrutiny. Second, an individual's status as a former arrestee
completely eliminates several special needs arguments traditionally
advanced by proponents of DNA databanks-namely, the arguments
that deterrence and identification of criminal offenders present special
needs. Third, should a court decide to balance private interests against
the government's interests in performing a search in the absence of
individualized suspicion an individual's status as a former arrestee
263. See supra Part III.C.3.
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significantly increases his expectation of bodily integrity and genetic
privacy.
Ultimately, because the primary purpose of suspicionless DNA
sampling of former arrestees would be to solve crimes-an ordinary law
enforcement purpose-such sampling would violate the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus,
despite the recent trend towards expanding DNA databases around the
country, the DNA sampling of former arrestees reaches a bright line that
represents the constitutional end of such expansion.
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